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DISABILITY AND FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS:
MARRIAGE PENALTIES AND SUPPORT
ANOMALIES
Robert E. Rains*
INTRODUCTION: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

My duties at the Penn State University Dickinson School of Law
include supervising students in our Disability Law Clinic as well as
our Family Law Clinic. Several years ago, a woman came to the
Disability Law Clinic for legal help. She was a widow with a
severely mentally disabled daughter. The daughter was receiving
cash assistance from the federal government in the form of
Supplemental Security Income (SSI). 1 At that time, the maximum
individual benefit rate was probably about $480. The problem was
that, before he died, the child's father had gone to his family lawyer
because he naturally wanted to take care of his daughter with special
needs. The lawyer set up, and the father signed, a testamentary
support trust to pay his daughter $240 per month.
What was the result? SSI is a needs-based program with strict
income and resources rules. Any unearned income over $20 per
month results in a dollar-for-dollar reduction of SSI. 2 Every month
the trust paid the mentally disabled child $240. Every month the
Social Security Administration reduced her SSI by $220. In effect,
every month the trust paid $20 to the girl and $220 to the Social
Security Administration. The girl's federal benefits were effectively
cut almost in half.
What was to be done? Nothing; the trust was irrevocable.
* Professor of Law, Director of Disability Law Clinic, Co-Director of Family Law Clinic, the
Pennsylvania State University Dickinson School of Law. The author wishes to thank Nancy G. Shor,
Ethel Zelenske, and Barbara Silverstone, all of the National Organization of Social Security Claimants'
Representatives, for their assistance in providing information and insights in the preparation of this
article. Parts of this article were presented at the 12th World Conference of the International Society of
Family Law in Salt Lake City in July 2005.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C) (2005).
2. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1124(c)(12) (2005).
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Was this result what the father intended? Obviously not. Did the
lawyer, no doubt a competent general practitioner, commit
malpractice? What is the public policy behind such a harsh result, and
is it sound?
This article will look at how federal law and family law treat
disability and disabled people in the specific contexts of marriage and
child support and will raise questions about the explicit and implicit
public policies underlying that treatment.
I.

SPECIAL MARRIAGE PENALTIES UNIQUE TO DISABLED PEOPLE

Marriage penalties have been much debated in recent years. The
debates have focused on unmarried dual income couples facing
significant federal income tax increases should they get married.
Almost no one has paid attention to the severe marriage penalties
often faced by persons with disabilities under the Social Security Act.
Nor, unlike the situation with the Internal Revenue Code, has there
been any significant political movement to ameliorate or eliminate
those penalties.
A. The DisabledAdult Child
A dependent child of a wage-earner who is disabled, retired or
deceased may be eligible for benefits on the wage-earner's account
under Title II of the Social Security Act. 3 For most dependent
children, these benefits end upon reaching age 18 or, if still in
elementary or secondary school, age 19. 4 However, if the child
himself is disabled or becomes disabled before age 22, the child can
continue to receive such benefits indefinitely as a Disabled Adult
Child (DAC).5

3. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2005).
4. § 402(d)(1)(B)(i).
5. § 402(d)(l)(B)(ii). Recently, The Social Security Administration has taken to referring to these
benefits as "Childhood Disability Benefits" (CDB). Since the SSA pays these benefits during adulthood,
although based on one's becoming disabled in childhood (before age 22), I shall avoid use of the
particularly confusing phrase, "Childhood Disability Benefits."
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John A. Jobst was a DAC. He applied for benefits on his father's
earnings record in 1956. 6 The Social Security Administration (SSA)
awarded John benefits commencing January 1957 based on his
cerebral palsy. 7 In October 1970, John married Sandra Lee, who also
8
had cerebral palsy, but was not receiving Social Security benefits.
As a result, the SSA terminated John Jobst's DAC benefits. 9 A DAC
beneficiary loses his benefits permanently if he marries someone who
is not also receiving Social Security, even if the spouse is totally and
permanently disabled.' 0
Jobst appealed the termination of his benefits through the SSA's
administrative processes and the federal court."l He argued that the
statute, as applied to a recipient who marries a totally disabled
person, violates the equal protection component of the Due Process
12
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
District Court Judge John W. Oliver agreed. 13 He found no rational
basis for the distinction between beneficiaries who marry disabled
persons who receive Social Security benefits and beneficiaries who
marry disabled persons who do not receive such benefits. 14
Of course, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision. 15
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Court noted that when
Congress established the DAC program in 1956, marriage to anyone
terminated DAC benefits. 16 Two years later, in 1958, Congress
created the exception allowing a DAC recipient to marry another
Social Security beneficiary without losing benefits. 17 Thus, it was

6. Jobst v. Richardson, 368 F. Supp 909, 910 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1)(D), (d)(5) (2005). If the marriage is subsequently annulled, rather than
ending in divorce or death of the spouse, the DAC recipient may have benefits reinstated. Social
Security
Administration
Policy
Site:
POMS
§
PR
07105.039,
https://sO44a90.ssa.gov/appsl0/poms.nsf/Inx/1501705039?opendocument.
11. Jobst, 368 F. Supp at 910-11.
12. id. at 910.
13. Id. at911.
14. Id. at 913.
15. Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977).
16. Id. at 51.
17. Id.
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really an expansion of benefits and partial amelioration of the
marriage penalty that Jobst was challenging. 18 The Court found a
rational basis for the distinction created by the 1958 amendment:
Both tradition and common experience support the conclusion
that marriage is an event which normally marks an important
change in economic status. Traditionally, the event not only
creates a new family with attendant new responsibilities, but also
modifies the pre-existing relationships between the bride and
groom and their respective families. Frequently, of course,
financial independence and marriage do not go hand in hand.
Nevertheless, there can be no question about the validity of the
assumption that a married person is less likely to be dependent
on his parents for support than one who is unmarried. 9
The Court reasoned that the exception to the marriage penalty
created by the 1958 amendment is simple to administer, as it requires
no individual inquiry into degrees of hardship or need.2° While
recognizing the unusual hardship that the general rule had inflicted
upon Jobst and that it might have been wiser for Congress to take a
larger step, the Court opined "the step Congress did take was in the
right direction and had no adverse impact upon the Jobsts.'
Today, almost three decades later, Congress has yet to take even
the small extra step of eliminating the permanent loss of DAC
benefits for DAC recipients who marry totally disabled persons who
do not receive Social Security benefits.
What public policy is served by this restriction? Had John Jobst
simply cohabited with his disabled significant other, his DAC
benefits would have been unaffected.22 It was the act of marriage that
23
caused their termination.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.
Id. at 51.
Id.
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One may posit various reasons why Congress has failed to act.
Inertia is one of them. At the political level, there are no organized
and funded groups seeking repeal of this particular marriage penalty.
Moreover, as the Court noted, Congress ameliorated to some extent
the harshness of this marriage penalty by the establishment of the SSI
program for indigent, disabled persons, which went into effect in
1974 and provided cash benefits to both Mr. and Mrs. Jobst that
totaled almost as much as John Jobst had previously been receiving
under the DAC program. 24 However, as with all categorical
assistance programs, SSI has various rules and limitations which may
make it unavailable to other DAC recipients who marry totally
25
disabled nonrecipients of Social Security.
It is difficult to believe that the administrative burden posited by
the Court would be significant. In fiscal year 2004, the SSA
adjudicated 2,522,826 disability claims at the initial level, 556,243 on
reconsideration, 447,268 at administrative law judge hearings, and
89,487 at its Appeals Council. 26 This was in addition to processing
1,677,423 continuing disability reviews. 27 In 2003, there were
752,813 adult children receiving Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits out of 6,830,714 disability insurance recipients. 28
Additionally, as of December 2003, there were a total of 5,592,504
disabled recipients of SSI nationally. 29 Thus, recipients of DAC
benefits constitute approximately 750,000 out of over 12,400,000
disabled beneficiaries. Disability determinations would only have to
be made in the small minority of cases in which: (1) a DAC recipient
married, (2) a nonrecipient of Social Security benefits, (3) who
claimed to be disabled, and (4) whom the SSA had not already
determined to be disabled for purposes of the SSI program. Surely
24. Id. at57n.17.
25. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1382 et seq. (2005).
26. NOSSCR, Disability Determinations and Appeals, Title 11. SSI, and Concurrent Claims and
CDRs, Fiscal Year 2004, 27 NOSSCR FORUM 23 (Apr. 2005).
27. Id.
28. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION No. 13-11826: ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT ON THE SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 32 tbl.3 (2003).

29. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION No. 13-11827: ANNUAL STATISTICAL
SUPPLEMENT, 2004 TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 7.1 tbl.7.A1 (2004).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2005).
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the number of disability claims that would be added by allowing a
DAC recipient to continue to receive benefits after marriage to a
disabled person not receiving benefits would be infinitesimal in the
general Social Security adjudicative system. Indeed, for Mrs. Jobst to
receive SSI benefits as she did, SSA had to determine she was
disabled. 3 1 Therefore, in the case of the Jobsts, no extra determination
would have become necessary if the marriage penalty were removed.
Yet this particular marriage penalty for DAC recipients remains.
B. The SSI MarriagePenalty
1. Eligible Couples
The Supreme Court accurately perceived in Jobst that the
draconian effects of the DAC marriage penalty were partially
ameliorated for Mr. and Mrs. Jobst by the fact that they both became
eligible for SSI as indigent, disabled persons. What the Court never
mentioned, and perhaps did not know, was that the Jobsts were
financially harmed by a different and severe marriage penalty in the
SSI program.
SSI provides federally-funded, modest cash benefits to indigent,
disabled persons (as well as blind persons, who are in a different
category than other disabled persons, and persons over age 65).32
Most disabled SSI recipients have not worked long enough or
contributed enough Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)
taxes over a long enough period to be eligible for Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. A minority of SSI recipients are
insured for and receive SSDI benefits, but their work history at low
paying jobs is so spotty that their SSDI benefits are lower than the
modest SSI cash benefits. Such individuals receive an SSI
33
supplement on top of their SSDI to bring them up to the SSI rate.

31. See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 49 (1977).
32. 20 C.F.R. § 416.101 (2005).
33. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1121(a), 416.1123 (2005).
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In 1974, when the SSI program became effective, both Mr. and
34
Mrs. Jobst were determined to be "eligible individuals" for SSl.
According to information provided to the Supreme Court by the SSA,
the total SSI that the Jobsts received was "only $20 less than the
amount they would have been receiving if Mr. Jobst's child's benefits
35
had been restored.,
But had John Jobst merely cohabited with Sandra Lee rather than
marry her, their total SSI benefits would have been a full third
greater.36 This is because of the SSI marriage penalty, which is
separate and distinct from the DAC marriage penalty.
The SSA spells out the SSI marriage penalty in its rather complex
regulations. For 1996, (the last year listed in the published
regulations) an eligible individual could receive the maximum federal
rate of $470 per month.37 Two eligible persons living together and
equally sharing expenses could each receive $470 per month, for a
total of $940 per month.38 But if those two eligible cohabiting people
marry each other, their total benefits would reduce to $705 per
month.39 In 1996, the act of marriage would therefore cost the
cohabiting indigent, disabled couple $235 per month, a huge decrease
for a couple previously subsisting on $940 per month.
The current SSI rates, available on the SSA's website, show that
the marriage penalty for SSI couples who marry has significantly
increased in terms of actual dollars. In 2006, an eligible individual
may receive a maximum of $603 per month in SSI. 4 1 Thus, two
cohabiting eligible individuals thus may receive a maximum of
$1,206 monthly.42 But an eligible married couple can only receive a

34. Califano,434 U.S. at 58 n.17.
35. Id.
36. See 20C.F.R. § 416.1131 (2005).
37. § 416.410. A significant number of states add supplemental payments onto SS1. See generally
SSA's Program Operations Manual System, SI 014: State Supplementary Payments,
https:flsO44a9O.ssa.gov/appsI0/poms.nsf/subchapterlist!openview&restricttocategory50504
38. § 416.1133.
39. § 416.412.
40. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Press Office Fact Sheet: 2006 Social Security Changes
(Oct. 2005), http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2006.htm.
41. Id. This is exclusive of any state supplementary payment. See supra, note 37.
42. Id.
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maximum of $904 per month, thus suffering a full $300 per month
marriage penalty. 43 In annual terms, an eligible unmarried couple in
2006 can receive maximum SSI benefits of $14,472. If the couple
marries, their maximum 2006 SSI benefits will be $10,848.
To put this into perspective, the United States Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS) has set the 2006 federal poverty
guideline for a two-person family unit in the 48 contiguous states and
the District of Columbia at $13,200. 44 Thus, an unmarried,
cohabiting, eligible couple of two indigent, disabled people can
receive enough SSI to have income exceeding the federal poverty
guideline by $1,272. But if they marry, their income will fall to a
level $2,352 below the federal poverty guideline.
2. Individual SSI Applicants
As noted, most recipients of SSDI benefits are disabled workers,
that is, persons who worked long enough and paid their FICA taxes
long enough to be insured for disability purposes. 45 But, many people
with disabilities have either not worked enough, or not worked
recently enough at the time of onset of disability, to be eligible. If
such people are both indigent and disabled, they can usually collect
SSI.

46

Here too, there is a marriage penalty; this penalty is found in
SSA's "deeming rules." Simply put, if a person who would otherwise
be eligible for SSI is married and lives with her ineligible spouse, the
ineligible spouse's income is "deemed" to the otherwise eligible
applicant.

47

The classic example is the housewife who may have engaged in
paid employment for several years before marriage and continued to
do so for some time into marriage. She then stays home to raise a
family, intending to return to paid employment after the youngest
child reaches school age. Often, she is out of the labor market for six
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 71 Fed. Reg. 3848 (Jan. 24, 2006).
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.130-.133 (2005).
See generally id.§§ 416.101,416.110,416.210.
Id. §§ 416.1160(a)(1), 416.1163.
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or more years. If, through illness or injury, she then becomes
disabled, she will not be eligible for SSDI benefits because, after five
years of not working at a paid job, she simply will no longer be
insured under this program.48
SSI benefits for this disabled housewife will be reduced the more
income her husband earns. If her husband earns too much income,
she will not be eligible for SSI, just as she is not eligible for SSDI
benefits. In 2005, in a household with two healthy children, if the
ineligible spouse earned $2,403 per month or more, the disabled
spouse would not receive SSI benefits.49
Inasmuch as SSI is intended to be an anti-poverty program, in
effect a safety net under Social Security's safety net, spouse-tospouse income deeming may be viewed as perfectly reasonable. The
program is funded out of general revenues, not the Social Security
trust fund, and taxpayers could hardly be expected to pay SSI to the
disabled spouse of, for example, a moderately affluent law
50
professor.
On the other hand, the marriage penalty for the noninsured
disabled person is real and ongoing. 5 1 It is real because if the disabled
homemaker in our example had not married the father of her children,
but simply cohabited with him, his income would not be deemed to
her. In that situation, she might well be eligible for SSI and only have
the maximum benefits reduced by one-third if she were deemed to be
living in another person's household.52
In the alternative, if she were a married housewife, but separated
from her husband, she would likely become eligible for SSI because,
in that situation, the SSA would only consider the periodic payments
she actually receives from her husband-or ex-husband-as income to
48. Id. § 404.130.
49. SSA

POLICY

OPERATIONAL

MANUAL

SYSTEM,

SI

01320ff,

http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsflnx/0501320000 (last visited Mar. 11, 2006). The cited figures apply in
Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Delaware, and Washington, D.C. Because of the
operation of state supplements to SSI, these figures will be slightly different in other jurisdictions. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1163(d)(2)(iii), 416.2025(b) (2005).
50. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, PUBLICATION NO. 05-11000: SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY

INCOME (Aug. 2005), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/l1000.html.
51. 20 C.F.R. § 416.412 (2005).
52. Id. §416.1131.
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her. 53 In this sense, the SSI marriage penalties operate differently
from the DAC marriage penalty. The DAC marriage penalty is
permanent and not based on cohabitation. 54 Once a DAC recipient
marries a nonrecipient of Social Security benefits, the DAC benefits
end. 55 It does not matter whether the DAC beneficiary and spouse
later cease cohabitation or divorce; the DAC benefits will not be
reinstated.56 But for both SSI eligible couples and potentially SSI
eligible individuals, the marriage penalty can be overcome by
separation or divorce. 57 Thus, every month SSI eligible couples and
potentially SSI eligible married individuals have a financial incentive
from the federal government to separate or divorce. Of course, for the
potentially SSI eligible individual married to a reasonably highearning spouse, this incentive is merely theoretical. The less her
spouse earns, through the lower middle income range, the greater the
incentive. If her spouse is a low earner, again the incentive will only
be theoretical. In 2005, in a four-person household with two healthy
$1,245 per month, the
children, if the working spouse made less than 58
benefits.
SSI
full
receive
could
spouse
disabled
There is one other significant way in which the marriage penalty
operates differently in the DAC program than in the SSI program.
The DAC program penalizes the entry into a lawful marriage. 59 The
SSI program penalizes cohabitation with a "spouse," which includes
not only those who are legally married, but unrelated couples who
cohabit and lead people to believe they are married.6 °
C. FavoredCouples: More Unintended Consequences
There is one type of married couple or spouses who occupy a
special privileged position vis-a-vis the marriage penalty provisions
of the Social Security Act discussed above. None of these marriage
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. § 416.1121(b).
20 C.F.R. § 404.352(b)(4).
Id.
Id. § 404.351.
See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.410, 416.412, 416.1806 (2005).
See SSA POMS, supranote 50.
20 C.F.R. § 404.352(b)(4) (2005).
Id. § 416.1806.
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penalties apply to these particular couples. I refer, of course, to samesex couples.
When Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in
1996, focused on nonrecognition of same-sex marriages which, at
that time, were not legal anywhere in the United States, it specifically
provided the following:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative
bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word "marriage"
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person
of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.6 '

While it is highly unlikely that proponents of DOMA intended to
specially benefit same-sex couples, one or both of whom is disabled,
that is certainly one of DOMA's effects. Even a legally married
same-sex couple in Massachusetts will not face the marriage penalty.
Nor in any state, can unmarried same-sex couples be treated as
spouses for SSI purposes; the SSI marriage penalties only apply to
62
opposite sex spouses.
D. Polygamy/Polyandry, or What About Tom Green?
Famous Utah polygamist Tom Green lived in either licensed
marriages or other forms of "conjugal-type relationships"
simultaneously with Lynda Penman, Beth Cook, Linda Kunz, Shirley
Beagley, June Johnson, LeeAnn Beagley, Cari Bjorkman, Hannah
Bjorkman, and Julie Dawn McKinley. 63 In his spare time, Green
appeared on various television shows with these women, consistently
referring to them as his wives. 64 In 2004, the Utah65Supreme Court
upheld Green's conviction on four counts of bigamy.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2005)).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1806(a)(3) (2005).
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 822 (Utah 2004).
Id. at 823.
Id.
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If either Green or any of these women were disabled, how would
the SSA treat their relationship for purposes of the marriage
penalties? Needless to say, the Social Security Act and regulations
probably never contemplated such a situation. After all, since 1878,
the United States Supreme Court has upheld the prohibition on
polygamy against constitutional attacks based on freedom of
66
religion.
Some of the answers are clear; some are not. IfGreen had been
receiving DAC benefits, he would have permanently lost them the
first time he became legally married to a nonrecipient of Social
Security benefits. 67 Similarly, if wife number one had been a DAC
recipient and Green were not a Social Security beneficiary, she would
have lost her DAC benefits. But how about wife number two, (or
three, or four, or five, etc.)? If she were a DAC recipient and Green
not a Social Security beneficiary, she would have a reasonable
argument that her DAC benefits should continue. The SSA looks to
state law to determine if a person is validly married. 68 Wife two (or
three, or four, or five, etc.) could argue that the same test should
apply to her, and that Green's bigamy convictions demonstrate that
her marriage to Green was not valid under state law and, hence her
DAC benefits should continue.
The results would be more obscure under the SSI marriage
penalties. The SSI regulations clearly contemplate that someone will
only have one spouse at a time. The regulations consider someone a
spouse (and therefore married) if one of the following applies: he or
she is legally married under the laws of the state; the SSA has
decided that he or she is entitled to husband's or wife's Social
Security benefits, or; he or she is cohabiting with a member of the
opposite sex, and the couple is holding themselves out as married.69
But the SSA adds a caveat: "If more than one person would qualify
as your husband or wife under [any of these tests], we will consider

66.
67.
68.
69.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-68 (1878).
20 C.F.R. § 404.352(b)(4) (2005).
Id. § 404.345.
Id. § 416.1806(a).
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the person you are presently living with to be your spouse for SSI
70
purposes."
Under the SSI regulations, Lynda, Beth, Linda, Shirley, June,
LeeAnn, Cari, Hannah, and Julie Dawn each had one spouse while
they all lived with Tom Green: only Tom Green. Furthermore, even
though Tom regularly referred to Lynda, Beth, Linda, Shirley, June,
LeeAnn, Cari, Hannah, and Julie Dawn as his wives, the regulation
suggests that only one may be counted as his spouse for SSI
purposes.71 The regulation is, of course, silent as to how to select
Tom's "SSI spouse. '72 But if the SSA read the regulation broadly to
include as spouses each of Lynda, Beth, Linda, Shirley, June,
LeeAnn, Cari, Hannah, and Julie Dawn, this could lead to interesting
results. Let us suppose that Tom and all of these ladies were disabled
and had been individually receiving SSI benefits before they met.
When Tom took spouse number one as cohabitant or wife, both of
their SSI benefits would have been reduced by one-fourth under the
SSI marriage penalty.73 In 2006, each would lose over $150 each
month.7 4 When spouse number two moved in, her SSI would also be
reduced by one-fourth. But what about Tom's SSI? Would it again be
reduced by one-fourth? And, if so, would that be one-fourth of his
already reduced SSI or one-fourth of his original full SSI benefit?
And, if it would be the latter, would Tom start owing the government
SSI when he took spouse number five? Fortunately, we need not
worry about such philosophical or mathematical problems as Tom
Green is now incarcerated, and incarcerated individuals are ineligible
75

for SSI.

E. It's Not All Bad
The marriage penalties discussed above are very significant and no
doubt influence many couples' decisions to marry, cohabit, separate,
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. § 418.1806(b).
See id. § 416.1806(b).
Id.
See SocAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 41.
Id.
State v. Green, 99 P.3d 820, 834 (Utah 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 416.211 (2005).
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or divorce. It should not, however, be assumed that the Social
Security Act always penalizes disabled persons for marriage; that is
certainly not the case. Under the Act, many benefits flow to certain
disabled persons from being or having been married. For example, a
widow or widower who was married for at least nine months before
the death of the wage-earning spouse may receive disability
insurance benefits on the deceased spouse's earnings record if a
number of other conditions are met.76 In similar circumstances, a
surviving divorced spouse can receive benefits if the marriage lasted
at least ten years. 77 Hence, for surviving divorced spouses, there is
not only an incentive to marry, but an incentive to stay married for at
least a decade.
II. CHILD SUPPORT

A. The DisabledSupporting Parent
Difficult questions arise when a parent under a duty of child
support is, or becomes, unable to work. As a general matter, of
course, support orders are based in whole or in part on the obligor's
ability to pay.78 Indeed, a proven inability to make payments on a
support order would be a complete defense to civil or criminal
contempt of that order.7 9 In states such as Pennsylvania, which are
"income shares model" states, the custodial parent's income is also a
80
factor in setting support.
Fortunately, in many cases the disabled parent will be eligible for
either SSDI benefits or SSI. 8 1 State courts have grappled with how

76. 20 C.F.R. § 404.335.
77. Id. § 404.336.
78. See generally Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988).
79. Id. at 637-38.
80. See Jenkins v. Jenkins, 704 A.2d 231, 235-36 (Conn. 1998).
81. Obviously, a disabled support obligor may receive income from additional sources, such as: tort
settlements, workers' compensation, state pensions, private pensions, etc. These are beyond the scope of
this paper. But see Duke v. Richards, 600 S.E.2d 182 (W. Va. 2004) (discussing veteran's disability
benefits); Navas v. Navas, 599 S.E.2d 479 (Va. Ct. App. 2004) (discussing transit authority disability
allowance).
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payments under these programs should be treated for support
purposes and have reached inconsistent results.
The problem of the treatment for support purposes of both the
disabled worker's SSDI benefits and the child's auxiliary benefits has
received scant scholarly attention. 82 One problem with trying to
address this subject is the differences from state to state in the
operation of their child support guidelines, which can be very
detailed and complex. Although the federal Family Support Act
mandates that each state have child support guidelines which create a
rebuttable presumption of the correct amount of child support, the
federal law does not dictate the actual state guidelines. 83 Hence, they
vary. A second problem is that, to be frank, sometimes a state court
will show an appalling lack of understanding of the programs
administered by the SSA. 84 For example, in 2004 an appellate court
in Connecticut referred to a child receiving dependency benefits
based on his mother's receipt of SSI. 85 Since there are no dependency
benefits under the SSI program, one can only deduce that the disabled
86
parent was in fact receiving SSDI benefits rather than SSI.
1. Social Security DisabilityInsurance Benefits
A worker who has paid into the Social Security trust fund, through
FICA taxes, over a sufficient period of time, and who then becomes
disabled, may be eligible for SSDI benefits under Title II of the
Social Security Act. 87 Significantly, if the disabled worker is granted

82. See Angela F. Epps, To Pay or Not to Pay, That Is the Question: Should SSI Recipients Be
Exempt from Child Support Obligations?,34 RUTGERS L.J. 63 (2002); Tori R.A. Kricken, Child Support
and Social Security Dependent Benefits: A Comprehensive Analysis and Proposalfor Wyoming, 2 WYO.
L. REV. 39 (2002); see also Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Right to Credit on Child Support
Payments for Social Security or Other Government Dependency Payments Made for the Benefit of
Child, 34 A.L.R. 5th 447, 469-87 (1995).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (2005).
84. I do not mean to fault the courts, but rather the lawyers whose job it is to edify them.
85. Tarbox v. Tarbox, 853 A.2d 614, 616 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
86. Compare 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (2005) (defining SSDI benefits), and 20 C.F.R. § 404.301-.392
(2005) (defining same), with 20 C.F.R. § 416.401-.480 (2005) (defining SSI benefits).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (2005).
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SSDI, there may also be "auxiliary"
cash benefits for the worker's
88
spouse and minor children.
The most common scenario dealt with by state courts involves a
disabled noncustodial parent (usually the father) who owes a duty of
child support to the custodial parent to whom he may or may not be
married.
Whether the state looks only at the obligor's income or at both
parents' income, several interrelated questions arise:
(1) Are SSDI benefits paid to the noncustodial parent income
to that parent?
(2) Are auxiliary benefits paid to the child because of the
disability of a non-custodial parent:
(a) income to the child?
(b) income to the custodial parent?
(c) income to the non-custodial parent?
(3) Do auxiliary benefits paid to the child because of the
noncustodial parent's disability fulfill that parent's child
support obligation?
The prevailing view is that SSDI benefits paid to a noncustodial
parent are income for purposes of computing child support. Many
states make this explicit in their child support statute. For example,
Pennsylvania's support law includes as income both "social security
benefits" and "temporary and permanent disability benefits." 89 In
other states, the courts have readily interpreted their support statutes
to include SSDI benefits as income, although remarkably, obligors
continue to challenge their inclusion. As recently as 2004, the
Supreme Court of Nevada found that the noncustodial mother's SSDI
qualifies as a source of her gross monthly income. 90 The court
reasoned that the child support statute has a protective purpose to
provide adequate support to children and should be liberally

88. Id. § 402(b)-(d).
89. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302 (2005).
90. Metz v. Metz, 101 P.3d 779, 784 (Nev. 2004).

2006]

MARRIAGE PENALTIES AND SUPPORT ANOMALIES

construed. 9 1 In 2005, in Groensteinv. Groenstein, the Supreme Court
of Wyoming reached the same result, finding the noncustodial
parent's SSDI analogous to "worker's compensation payments,
disability benefits, and annuity and retirement benefits," all of which
are specifically included in income under that state's support
92
statute.
Analysis of a child's receipt of Social Security dependency
benefits on account of the disability of the noncustodial parent has
proven to be far more difficult. Typically, the SSA pays such
auxiliary benefits to a dependent minor through the child's custodial
parent as the child's "representative payee." 9 3 Even though such
moneys go directly to the custodial parent for the child and are not
reachable by the disabled, noncustodial parent, many state courts
have concluded that the payments do constitute income to the
noncustodial parent.
In 1994, in Whitaker v. Colbert, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
found that dependency benefits paid to the custodial parent on
account of the disability of the noncustodial father constitute income
to him.94 Following precedent from other jurisdictions, the Whitaker
court reasoned that since it was crediting the benefits against his
95
support obligation, they were an earned benefit to him.
In 1995, in Miller v. Miller, the Alaska Supreme Court likewise
found that dependency benefits paid to the custodial parent for the
children were income to the noncustodial parent. 96 The court
reasoned that the benefits are essentially earnings derived from the
disabled parent's past social security contributions. 97 As in Whitaker,
the court also credited the dependency benefits against the father's
support obligation. 98 Three years later in 1998, the Supreme Court of
91. Id.
92. 104 P.3d 765, 772 (Wyo. 2005).
93. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2021(c)(1) (2005).
94. 442 S.E.2d 429, 431-32 (Va. Ct. App. 1994).
95. Id.
96. 890 P.2d 574, 578 (Alaska 1995). The case involved Social Security retirement benefits rather
than disability benefits, but the court indicated that there is "no theoretical basis for distinguishing
between the two types of payment." Id. at 577.
97. Id. at 577-78.
98. Id.
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Connecticut in Jenkins v. Jenkins explicitly followed Whitaker and
Miller.99 The same principles were followed in 2005 by the Wyoming
00
Supreme Court in Groenstein v. Groenstein.1
However, this approach is neither uniform nor automatic. Taking
the contrary position, in 2005, the Indiana Court of Appeals in Brown
v. Brown upheld the refusal of a trial court to credit the disabled
noncustodial father with a back award of dependency benefits paid to
the mother for their child. 1 1 The father had not worked for a few
years "due to back injuries [and] surgery." 1° 2 In May 2003, the trial
court found his child support arrearages to be $7,595.04.103 Two
weeks later, the SSA sent the mother a check for the child in the
amount of $10,377 based on the father's disability. 10 4 The trial court
found that the payment of disability benefits was not child support,
and that the father was not entitled to a credit. 10 5 The appellate court
1 6
found this position was not clearly erroneous. 0
It is difficult to credit the rationales in Brown. One suspects that
the result has more to do with distaste for a "deadbeat dad"
(considering his poor record of making support payments or even
showing up for court hearings) than a reasoned analysis of the legal
situation. The Brown court pointed out that the father did not pay any
extra premiums for the child's benefits and his own benefits were not
reduced. 107 This is true, but how is it relevant? The court opined that
the child's benefits would be more appropriately added into the
custodial mother's income for purposes of recalculating the amount
0 8
of support, but it did not order a remand for that purpose.1
The court also declared that "giving the custodial parent dollar-fordollar credit for disability benefits received by the dependent child in
this case would result in the child's household owing money to the
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

704 A.2d 231, 235 (Conn. 1998).
Groenstein v. Groenstein, 104 P.3d 765, 772-73 (Wyo. 2005).
823 N.E.2d 1224, 1228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
1d. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1226.
Brown, 823 N.E.2d at 1227.
Id. at 1228.

MARRIAGE PENALTIES AND SUPPORT ANOMALIES

20061

noncustodial parent on a weekly basis."' 109 This overlooks two
remedies. First, as noted in the prior cases, the same benefits can be
added to the father's income, thus increasing the amount of support
he owes. Second, even if the auxiliary benefits end up being greater
than the amount of support set under state guidelines, it does not
follow that the noncustodial parent in effect gets a refund or rebate.
Such a result has been considered and properly rejected by other
courts. In 1998, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
addressed this possibility:
There would be an exception if the amount of the support
obligation as calculated by this approach (or as adjusted by the
judge) is less than the amount of the SSDI dependency benefits.
In such case, the total support obligation is simply equal to the
amount of the SSDI dependency benefits, and the noncustodial
10
parent would not owe any additional amount.'
Likewise, in 2005 the Wyoming Supreme Court stated, "[s]hould
the support obligation be less than the dependency benefit, the noncustodial parent owes no additional amount, but he is not entitled to a
rebate."11

In deciding whether to credit a disabled, noncustodial parent's
child support account with Social Security payments made to a child,
some courts focus on whether the payments are made to the custodial
parent as representative payee or if they go directly to the child. Last
year, this distinction was dispositive for the Appellate Court of
Connecticut. 112 In Tarbox v. Tarbox, the parties were married and had
two children. 113 In the divorce settlement, the father agreed to pay
child support for each child until that child turned 18 or graduated
high school, whichever occurred later. 1 4 As it happened, both

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Rosenberg v. Merida, 697 N.E.2d 987, 991 n.7 (Mass. 1998).
Groenstein v. Groenstein, 104 P.3d 765, 774 n.2 (Wyo. 2005).
Tarbox v. Tarbox, 853 A.2d 614 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 616.
Id.
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children graduated high school after age 18 on the same day, June 22,
200." After the divorce, the father became disabled and applied for
what the court, based on the parties' stipulation, referred to as
"supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. ' 116 In
February 2001, the younger child, who had turned 18 in October
2000, received a lump sum payment of dependency benefits in the
amount of $7,328 for the period of March 2000 through January 2001
based on his father's disability. 117 Thereafter, the son received a
monthly benefit check in the amount of $685 until he graduated high
119
school." l8 At all relevant times, this son resided with the mother.
As already noted, the court is clearly incorrect in referring to these
benefits as supplemental security income (SSI), which does not pay
dependency benefits. 12 As the father was in arrears in his child
support payments, the mother filed for contempt.121 The father crossfiled to offset the dependency benefits against his support
arrearages. 122 The trial court granted the father a credit123against his
child support obligation, but the appellate court reversed.
Although the appellate court in Tarbox acknowledged the
Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins v. Jenkins,124 it
found that decision not controlling where the dependency benefits are
paid directly to an adult child. 125 This is odd because the Jenkins
court specifically noted that the state support "guidelines were
amended by the commission in 1994 in order to grant a credit to noncustodial parents for Social Security dependency benefits paid
directly to their dependent children."' 26 The appellate court faulted
Mr. Tarbox for not having earlier petitioned to modify support and

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Tarbox, 853 A.2d at 616.
Id. at 616 n.4.
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.301-.392 (2005).
Tarbox, 853 A.2d at 617.
Id.
Id. at 616.
704 A.2d 231, 235-36 (Conn. 1998).
Tarbox, 853 A.2d at 619-620.
Jenkins, 704 A.2d at 234.
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for failing to notify the court of his pending disability claim, as
opposed to letting his arrears accrue. 127 The court went on to reason
that: "[t]he [father's] decision to direct payment of dependency
benefits to the younger of the parties' children, who had reached the
age of majority, did not relieve
him of his obligation to pay child
128
support to the defendant."'
Again the court demonstrates a lack of understanding of the Social
Security system. It is the SSA which, in its wisdom, directs that back
129
awards of dependency benefits be paid directly to adult children.
While the father may have appropriately identified the child's bank
account for direct payment, neither he nor the mother could have
required SSA to pay all or part of the dependency benefits to the
mother. SSA's Program Operations Manual System (POMS) clearly
requires direct payment to the adult child unless that child is himself
mentally incapable and thus in need of a representative payee. 130 In
effect, the Tarbox court punished Mr. Tarbox for a decision that he
did not make and over which he had no control whatsoever.
The Tarbox decision, with its misstatements of Social Security law
and practice, perhaps illustrates the inherent difficulties of courts'
trying to decide these complex and nuanced issues on a case-by-case
basis at the mercy of individual litigants or their attorneys who are
likely far more knowledgeable about family law than disability law.
A better approach, the one followed in Pennsylvania, would be for
the agency within the state system charged with adopting and
revising the support guidelines to try to draft specific guidelines
131
addressing these issues.
In 2000, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its rule-making
capacity, adopted amendments to the state support guidelines on the
127. Tarbox, 853 A.2d at 621.
128. Id.
129. Social Security
Administration
Policy Site:
POMS
Section
GN 00501.010,
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200501010!opendocument (last visited Mar. 12, 2006); Social
Security
Administration
Policy
Site:
POMS
Section
GN
00502.070,
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0200502070!opendocument (last visited Mar. 12, 2006); Social
Security
Administration
Policy
Site:
POMS
Section
GN
00603.070,
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/02006030070!opendocument (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
130. See sources cited supra note 129.
131. PA.R. CIv.P. 1910.16-2(2005).
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effect of dependency benefits in calculating support. 132 The
amendments, in their current form, read as follows:
If a child for whom support is sought is receiving Social Security
benefits as a result of a parent's retirement, death or disability,
the benefits the child receives shall be added to the combined
monthly net incomes of the obligor and the obligee to calculate
the income available for support on the vertical axis of the basic
child support schedule.... The presumptive amount of support

as set forth on the schedule at the combined income of the
obligee, obligor and child's benefits shall then be reduced by the
amount of the child's benefits before apportioning the remaining
support obligation between the parties pursuant to Rule 1910.164.133

Translated into English, the child's benefits are not imputed to
either parent's income, but are added to the total family income pool,
resulting in a higher figure of presumptive child support against
which the dependency benefit is then offset. The court provides the
following example of how the rule should operate:
If the obligor has net income of $1200 per month; the obligee
has net monthly income of $800; and the child receives Social
Security derivative benefits of $300 per month as a result of
either the obligor's or obligee's retirement or disability, then the
total combined monthly net income is $2,300. Using the
schedule . . . for one child, the amount of support is $568 per

month. From that amount, subtract the amount the child is
receiving in Social Security derivative benefits ($568 minus
$300 equals $268). Then, apply the formula at Rule 1910.16-4 to
apportion the remaining child support amount of $268 between
the obligor and the obligee in proportion to their respective
incomes. The obligor's $1200 net income per month is 60% of
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1910.16-2(b)(2).
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the total of the obligor's and the obligee's combined net monthly
income. Thus, the obligor's support obligation would be 60% of
$268, or $161, per month.'34
This approach has the great benefit of providing explicit guidance,
not just to the trial level courts, but also, importantly, to the personnel
in the Domestic Relations Offices who are not usually lawyers, but
who must regularly set and modify child support orders. It also neatly
addresses the less common situation, which will be dealt with below,
where the child lives with the disabled parent.
In her thoughtful article in the Wyoming Law Review, Child
Support and Social Security Dependent Benefits, Tori R.A. Kricken
concludes that:
Wyoming should follow the majority lead of incorporating the
benefit payments into the obligor-parent's income and,
subsequently, allowing a set-off of his support obligations. Only
through this method can Wyoming courts recognize that,
although paid to the child, dependent benefits represent income
of the parent. Only through the obligor-parent's work history has
such a benefit accrued. And only by allowing an associated
credit can the disabled, non-custodial parent's obligations be
135
calculated justly.
While there is much to be said for both the Pennsylvania rule and
Kricken's majority-based proposal, I suggest a simpler approach
based directly on the Social Security Act. Under the Act, the child's
benefit is equal to one-half of the disabled parent's benefit, subject to
a "family maximum" if there are too many auxiliaries (dependents)
receiving benefits on the same account. 36 I propose that where the
noncustodial, disabled parent has no other source of income than his
or her own SSDI benefits, the amount his or her child receives from

134. Id. at Example 1.
135. Kricken, supra note 83, at 88.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(2) (2005); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.353(a), 404.403-04 (2005).
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SSA as a dependent should automatically become the presumptive
amount of child support, and this amount should presumptively
govern, even retroactively, for the entire time the child is in payment
status. Further, as every court that has addressed the issue (other than
Connecticut Court of Appeals in Tarbox) has held, if the child's
benefits exceed a pre-set support figure, the excess would simply be
an extra benefit to the child, with no rebate or refund to the obligor
parent. 137 My suggested approach, like Pennsylvania's, would avoid
the legal fiction that a parent is receiving benefits which the parent is
not in fact receiving and does not control.
2. Supplemental Security Income
Not surprisingly, there is little law on the child support obligations
of a noncustodial parent receiving SSI. By definition, that parent is
both disabled and indigent, hardly a good candidate from whom to
extract any significant amount of support. SSI is a welfare program.
Benefits rates are low. As noted, the current maximum federal SSI
rate for an individual is $603 per month. 138 Additionally, to be
eligible an individual must have very limited countable resources. If
the disabled person's countable resources exceed $2,000, he is simply
139
ineligible for SSI.
In her excellent article on SSI and support obligations, Professor
Angela Epps notes that several states' support laws exclude SSI from
the definition of income, either specifically or as need-based public
assistance. 140 Other states exclude SSI from income in the regulations
setting forth their support guidelines. For example, Pennsylvania's
support regulation provides, "[n]either public assistance nor
shall be counted as
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits
14 1
income for purposes of determining support."'
137. See Kricken, supra note 83, at 79-80.
138. See SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
139. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (2005).
140. See Epps, supra note 83, at 82 n.134; see also Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 20
S.W.3d 273, 278 n.2 (Ark. 2000) ("[38] states exempt SSI benefits from inclusion in a calculation of
gross income for child support purposes.").
141. PA. R. Civ. P. 1910.16-2(b)(1) (2005).
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Even in states with a very broad statutory definition of "income,"
courts are likely to interpret the support law to effectively exclude
SSI from a parent's income. In Davis v. Office of Child Support
Enforcement in 2000, the Arkansas Supreme Court found that
"although SSI comes within the definition of income for childsupport purposes, it is not subject to state court jurisdiction."' 142 The
majority relied heavily on the facts that the noncustodial parent had
no other source of income and the Social Security Act exempts SSI
from "execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal
process."' 143 In an interesting dissent, the Chief Justice noted that the
disabled parent paid absolutely nothing in child support while using
144
her SSI, among other things, to smoke a pack of cigarettes a day.
He suggested that the money spent on cigarettes could more
1 45
appropriately be used for child support.
A fairly recent case expressing the minority view is the Kentucky
Supreme Court's 1998 decision in Commonwealth ex rel. Morris v.
Morris.146 The unusual background of Morris is that prior to July
1994, the Kentucky support law excluded SSI benefits from child
support calculations, but effective July 1994, the statute was amended
147
to specifically include SSI in the definition of "gross income."
Oddly, other "means-tested public assistance programs" remain
excluded from the definition. 148 Mr. Morris was under an order to pay
149
the minimal sum of $31.50 per week for his four minor children.
He applied for and received SSI as a disabled, indigent person.150 The
trial court twice rejected his motions to reduce his child support, but
on appeal of the second denial, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the Kentucky support law regarding SSI was in
conflict with the anti-alienation provisions for SSI contained in the

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Davis, 20 S.W.3d at 278.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 407, 1383(d)(1), 659 (2000).
Davis, 20 S.W.3d at 278-79.
Id.
984 S.W.2d 840 (Ky. 1998).
Id. at 840-41.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 840.
Id.

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:561

Social Security Act.151 The Kentucky Supreme Court, in a 4-3
decision, reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the support
52

order.1

The majority viewed the case very narrowly: whether the existence
of a child support order based on a parent's receipt of SSI violates the
federal prohibition on subjecting SSI benefits to "execution, levy,
attachment, garnishment, or other legal process."' 153 In the absence of
any legal process to collect on the support order, the majority found
that "in its present posture" the case did not present a conflict with
54
federal law. 1
The three judge dissent found the majority's analysis incomplete
and unrealistic. 155 Since the father had no other source of income than
SSI, and had been ordered to pay child support, the conflict was, in
156
the dissent's view, real and present.
One can view the minority position taken by the Kentucky
legislature and supreme court two ways. Some may think of it as
expressing a moral command that all parents owe a duty of child
support to their minor children, and they should be ordered to make
payments, no matter how small or how unlikely to be collected.
Under this view, Kentucky's position is a statement of principle
rather than a realistic effort to obtain child support. In most cases, this
is probably all that can be said for Kentucky's inclusion of SSI as
gross income. But it cannot be denied that there may be
circumstances in which the Kentucky rule can actually lead to legally
obtained child support. Should Mr. Morris, for example, use a dollar
of his SSI to purchase a lottery ticket and hit the jackpot, or receive
an inheritance from his late Aunt Sally, those moneys would be
subject to attachment to pay the accrued child support based on his
SSI, in addition to being counted as gross income. It is difficult to see
how attachment of other sources of money to pay a support order
151.
152.
153.
U.S.C.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Morris, 984 S.W.2d at 842.
Id. at 841 (emphasis removed) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 407(a), made applicable to SSI through 42
§ 1383(d)(1)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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based on SSI would violate the anti-attachment of SSI provisions in
the Social Security Act.
3. ConcurrentBenefits
There is a relatively small group of disabled persons who have
worked and paid FICA taxes long enough to be insured for SSDI but
who, because of low earnings, have a "primary insurance amount"
(PIA) which is actually less than the SSI benefit rate. 157 If such
persons are otherwise eligible for SSI, they will receive "concurrent"
benefits under both programs: SSDI at the rate of their PIA, plus an
158
SSI supplement to bring their total benefits up to the SSI level.
Thus in 2006, in a state that does not add a supplementary payment,
if a disabled person eligible for full SSI were also insured for
disability purposes, but his PIA was only $400, his monthly federal
benefits would be as follows:
$400 (SSDI)
+$203 (SSI supplement)
$603 (total concurrent benefits = maximum SSI)
There is one recent decision dealing with the support implications
of the noncustodial parent's concurrent receipt of SSDI and SSI. In
Metz v. Metz, the parents were previously married and had one child
who came to live with the father. 159 The trial court concluded that
concurrent benefits, she could not
because the mother was receiving
160
support.
child
pay
be ordered to
In late 2004, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed in part. 16 1 It
found that both SSDI and SSI are included in "gross monthly
income" under the Nevada support statute. 162 As to SSI, however, the
157. Based on the author's quarter century of disability law practice, it appears that such individuals
usually have significant mental impairments.
158. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1100,416.1121(a), 416.1123,416.1124(c)(12) (2005).
159. 101 P.3d 779,781 (Nev. 2004).
160. Id. at 782.
161. Id. at 787.
162. id. at783.
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court found Nevada law to be preempted by the SSI anti-attachment
provisions in the Social Security Act. Including SSI as income would
do 'major damage' to a clear and substantial federal interest," and
163
thus was barred by the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Nevada Supreme Court went on to find that since federal law
allows the attachment of Social Security benefits to satisfy a support
order, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to consider
the mother's SSDI benefits. 164 Since the trial court had not made
findings of fact regarding the amount of SSDI the mother received,
165
the state supreme court remanded the case for further proceedings.
While the court's reasoning makes statutory sense, since the
mother's SSDI benefits are below even the minimal level of SSI, it is
difficult to believe that she would be placed under any but the most
minimal, token child support order on remand.
B. The Disabled CustodialParent
As should be expected, there is considerably less law on the child
support implications in the situation where the custodial parent, rather
than the noncustodial parent, is disabled. This is in part because,
where one parent is disabled, it is likely that any children will be
raised by the other parent. Particularly in the case of mental
disabilities or severe physical disabilities, those disabilities will often
be found to impact the best interest of the child in a custody
determination. 166 Additionally, in those states which do not use the
income shares model for child support determination, but only look at
the income of the noncustodial parent, there is simply no occasion to
consider disability benefits received by the custodial parent. Thus,
there are few cases dealing with support calculations where a child is
receiving dependency benefits based on the disability of her custodial
parent.

163. Id. at 785 (citing Davis v. Office of Child Support Enforcement, 20 S.W.3d 273 (2000)).
164. Id.
165. Metz, 101 P.3dat787.
166. See Linda A. Francis, Annotation, Mental Health of Contesting Parent as Factor in Award of
Child Custody, 53 A.L.R. 5th 375 (1997).
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In 2003, in Adams v. Adams, a Missouri appellate court considered
various economic arguments in a father's appeal of a marital
dissolution and the mother's cross-appeal. 167 Although the court
it
referred to "joint legal and physical custody of both parties," 168
mother.
her
with
primarily
lived
Jennifer,
child,
appears that one
The mother applied for and received SSDI benefits, for which the
SSA paid her $798 per month and Jennifer $398 per month. 169 The
trial court only counted the mother's $798 in calculating monthly
child support for Jennifer. 170 The father also unsuccessfully
challenged the mother's need for maintenance, asserting that she was
not fully disabled and that she could earn $749 a month and keep
17 1
those earnings in addition to maintaining her disability benefits.
Clearly his lawyer did not understand that earning money at this level
than
would render the mother ineligible for disability benefits in less
172
SSDI.
her
than
her
to
income
a year and actually result in less
The father relied on Weaks v. Weaks in which the Missouri
Supreme Court had ruled that it would be inequitable to withhold
credit for a child's dependency benefits against the child support
obligation of a disabled parent.173 Since Jennifer's benefits were
intended to replace income from her disabled, custodial mother, the
to give the father a credit and thus
court in Adams saw "no reason"
74
1
reduce his support obligation.
One must be cautious in interpreting Adams. The Adams court
reviewed the trial court on an "abuse of discretion" standard. 175 The
court stopped short of mandating that there can never be a reduction
in the nondisabled, noncustodial parent's child support on account of

167. 108 S.W.3d 821, 821 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
168. Id. at 824.
169. Id. at 823.
170. Id. at 824.
171. Id. at 825.
172. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592 (2005) (explaining that the mother would use up her "trial work
period" in nine months, after which, if she kept working at that level, she would not be entitled to
benefits).
173. 832 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991).
174. Adams v. Adams, 108 S.W.3d 821, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003).
175. Id. at 828.
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the dependency benefits the child derives from the custodial
76

parent. 1

In 2005, in Holtgrewe v. Holtgrewe, another Missouri appellate
court rejected the crediting of a nondisabled parent with dependency
benefits her child received based on the disability of the other
parent. 177 The case is confusing because there were two children born
of the marriage, Jamie and Devon, one of which resided with each
parent.178 The mother worked, and the father received SSDI benefits,
as did the children as his dependents. 179 The two households and their
180
actual incomes were as follows:
Mother's household:
Mother $2,158/month (earned)
Jamie $252/month (SSDI)
Total = $2,410/month.

Father's household:
Father $ 1,01 1/month (SSDI)
Devon $252/month (SSDI)
Total = $1,263/month

The trial court credited each parent with $252 per month for the
child in that parent's custody.' 8 1 Based on the parties' respective
incomes and the mutual credits, the trial court ruled that neither
82
parent owed the other child support.'
The father appealed, asserting that the mother should not receive a
credit for Jamie's dependency benefits derived from the father's
disability. 183 The court of appeals agreed. 184 Citing Weaks and
Adams, the court found that it was error for the trial court to have
given the mother credit for benefits that were intended to replace
85
income from the father. 1

Although the court was not explicit in its remand order, it would
appear that the mother will accordingly owe the father $252 per
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 821.
155 S.W.3d 784 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 785.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Holtgrewe, 155 S.W.3d at 785.
Id. at 787.
Id. at 786.
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month in child support. If this is a correct assumption, the net income
of the mother's mothly household would then be $2,158 with which
to raise one child, while the father's household income would be
$1,505 per month with which to raise the other child. While the
income to the mother and one child would still be substantially
greater than that for the father and the other child, it would no longer
be double.
In 2004, in Elsenheimer v. Elsenheimer, a California appellate
court grappled with the effect of a custodial parent's receipt of SSI on
a pre-existing child support order. 186 The parents were divorced with
two children who resided primarily with the mother.' 87 The father
was under a child support order of $1,308 per month when the
mother applied for and began to receive SSI as a disabled person in
the amount of $778 monthly.' 88 The father sought a downward
modification based in part on the mother's receipt of SSI. 1 89 As
intervenor on behalf of the mother, the Department of Child Support
190
Services (DCSS) argued that SSI cannot be counted as income.
The trial court disagreed, reasoning that although the mother could
not be required to pay support out of her SSI, it would be imputed
income to her. 191 Based on the mother's receipt of SSI and other
factors, the trial court reduced the father's monthly child support
obligation from $1,308 to $465.192
In a brief opinion, the appeals court reversed, relying on the
statutory definition of gross income which specifically excludes
"income derived from any public assistance program, eligibility for
193
which is based on a determination of need."'
While the court was no doubt correct as a pure matter of statutory
construction, the result in this case is actually perverse. The DCSS
186. 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 447 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
187. Id. at 449.
188. Id. California provides generous state supplementary benefits to federal SSI. See Social Security
Administration
Policy
Site:
POMS
Section
SI
01415.037,
http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsfllnxI0501415037 (last visited Mar. 12, 2006).
189. Elsenheimer,22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 449.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 449 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 4058(c)).
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was able to intervene because the children receive public assistance,
and the DCSS is entitled to contribution from the father. Thus the
DCSS was the real party in interest, not the mother or the children.
By refusing to allow the father to decrease his child support
payments, the court benefited DCSS at the expense of the children.
Although the mother was their primary custodian, the father had the
children 49% of the time.1 94 Had he paid less child support ostensibly
to the mother, but actually to DCSS, the likely financial beneficiaries
would have included the children. While a dollar-for-dollar reduction
of his child support would have conflicted with the public policy of
having parents contribute to state support of their children, a partial
reduction would have maintained some reimbursement to the state
while directly benefiting the children during the half of their lives
spent with their father. On the other hand, the Elsenheimers could be
accused of "gaming the system" by arranging for the children to
spend 51% of their time with the mother, so as to make the mother
and children eligible for welfare benefits under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.
C. The DisabledChild
Disabled minor children may, like adults, become eligible for SSI
benefits based on their own disability. 195 As a poverty program, SSI
is only available to children from low income households. 196 Similar
to spouse-to-spouse income deeming, there is parent-to-child income
deeming by which a parent's income will be "deemed" to the child
for SSI eligibility purposes where the parent and child reside
197
together.
In 2005, in a single parent household with one disabled child, that
child could be eligible for full SSI benefits if the parent earned less
than $1,283 per month or had unearned income of less than $619 per

194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 449.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C) (2005).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1100 (2005).
20 C.F.R. § 416.1160(a)(2) (2005).
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month. 198 The child would have become ineligible for SSI if the
per month or more, or had unearned
custodial parent earned $2,441
199
income of $1,198 or more.

But that is not the complete picture. The figures cited above
assume no other countable income to the disabled minor child. If the
noncustodial parent pays the custodial parent child support, that child
support will also affect SSI eligibility and computation, but under a
different formula.
Under the SSI rules, child support is a special kind of "unearned
income." In any month in which child support is paid, the SSA will
disregard the first $20.200 Further, the SSA will disregard "[o]ne-third
of support payments made to or for you by an absent parent if you are
a child." 2 °'
Let us suppose that in 2006, the disabled minor child living with
his indigent mother is receiving maximum federal SSI of $603 per
month.202 If the noncustodial father pays $170 in monthly child
support, the disabled child's SSI will be reduced from $603 per
month to $503 per month as follows:
$170

child support

- 20

general monthly disregard

$150
x 1/3
$100

special child support disregard
net child support resulting in dollar-for-dollar SSI
reduction

There is scant decisional authority on how a disabled child's
receipt of SSI should affect a parent's support obligation. As noted, a
majority of states do not consider SSI to be income for support

198. See SSA POMS, supra note 50 (discussing figures for Delaware, District of Columbia,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia).
199. Id.
200. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1124(a), (c)(12) (2005).
201. Id. §414.1124(c)(11).
202. This does not take into account any state supplementary payments. See SSA POMS, supra note
37.
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203

purposes.
Moreover, the disabled child may have extraordinary
needs not covered by SSI or Medical Assistance, which could give
rise to an upward deviation from a support guideline. Thus, the
noncustodial parent may have the worst of both worlds: no credit for
the SSI his child receives, plus increased support based on the child's
disability.
In March 2006, in Gifford v. Benjamin, the Appellate Division of
the Superior Court of New Jersey reversed a lower court that had
eliminated a father's child support obligation on the grounds that the
dependent child had begun to receive SSI in an amount greater than
the pre-existing support order. 204 The Appellate Court found that
there should be no credit against the support order based on the
child's receipt of SSI "because SSI benefits are 'means tested' based
20 5
on the child's disability and the custodial parent's financial need.
As previously noted, in Pennsylvania the support guidelines
specifically exclude consideration of SSI as income. 2°6 In one
appellate decision (which actually involved a disabled adult child),
the court suggested in a footnote that while the child's SSI could not
be considered as income for the support calculation, "we believe that
the trial court in its discretion may consider such income as a basis
for deviating from the guidelines . .

.

where application of the

guidelines would render an unjust result., 20 7 This same reasoning
would certainly also apply to the case of a minor child receiving SS1.
The concern about child support payments reducing, or even
eliminating, a disabled child's SSI (and possibly entitlement to
Medical Assistance) brings us back to one of the issues posed by the
opening vignette in this article. What can a noncustodial parent do for
either a minor or adult disabled child to help that child financially
while not unnecessarily jeopardizing the child's means-tested
benefits? The not-so-simple answer often involves creation of a
special needs or supplemental needs trust, which, if properly drafted,
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra Part II.A.2.
892 A.2d 738 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
Id.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1910.16-2 (2005).
Crawford v. Crawford, 633 A.2d 155, 165 n.ll (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
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can directly provide "luxuries" to the child, such as transportation,
travel, etc. 2 8 Had the father in our example created a proper special
needs trust instead of a support trust, he could have benefited his
daughter more than he benefited the SSA.
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Too few family lawyers take the time to master the admittedly
complex world of disability benefits. As a result, they make mistakes
that harm their clients and sometimes their clients' children in ways
which are quite avoidable. 2 09 Also, as a result, courts addressing
family law questions may make ill-informed decisions with
unfortunate consequences because of a lack of understanding of the
disability programs currently or potentially providing benefits to
litigants or their children.
Our society must strike a proper balance between the moral
imperative that parents support their disabled children and the moral
imperative that society ensure that the basic needs of disabled parents
and all children, including disabled children, are met.
Finally, all the arguments that were used against marriage penalties
in the Internal Revenue Code apply with even more force to the
marriage penalties in the Social Security Act. When President George
W. Bush declared October 12-18, 2003, to be "Marriage Protection
Week," he stated in part:
Marriage is a sacred institution, and its protection is essential to
the continued strength of our society.

208. See Jennifer Field, Special Need Trusts: Providing for Disabled Children Without Sacrificing
Public Benefits, 24 J. Juv. L. 79, 81-82 (2004).
209. The author is personally familiar with a situation in which a family law practitioner, based on
limited research, advised a DAC beneficiary that his impending marriage would not affect his continued
receipt of benefits. In the ensuing malpractice action, there was a six-figure settlement. See also ISBA
Mutual Risk Management Conference, 4th, Hot Topics in Risk Management, 10 (Chicago 2000).
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..By supporting responsible child-rearing and strong families,

my Administration is seeking to ensure that every child can grow
up in a safe and loving home.
We are also working to make sure that the Federal Government
does not penalize marriage. My tax relief package eliminated the
marriage penalty. And as part of the welfare reform package I
have proposed, we will do away with the rules that have made it
more difficult for married couples to move out of poverty.210
Almost three decades after Califano v. Jobst, there is no excuse for
our government to continue to drastically penalize those disabled
persons fully dependent on DAC benefits by permanently taking
away those benefits upon marriage, especially when they marry
another disabled person who is not receiving Social Security benefits.
Likewise, there cannot possibly be a justification for telling two
individual SSI recipients that they can live together unmarried with
no loss of benefits, but if they marry, they will lose so much of their
benefits that they will be reduced to living significantly below the
poverty line.

210. Proclamation No. 7714, 68 Fed. Reg. 58,257 (Oct.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/newsreleases/2003/10/20031003-12.html.

3,

2003),

available at

